

Covid-19 Economic Support and Withdrawal Exposure

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1. Introduction

There has been significant public comment about the federal government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic fall-out. From March 2020 when the scale of the pandemic became clear, the government was quick to step in and provide to individuals and businesses support including increased levels of income support for those who were unemployed (and others on selected income support payments) and support for business to keep workers employed. For the unemployed, the COVID-19 supplement, paid on top of Jobseeker payments was seen by many as an important boost, lifting the fortnightly benefits paid by \$150.

For eligible businesses the Jobkeeper program paid varying amounts—beginning with \$1500 per fortnight up till September 27 2020 and then winding back between September 2020 and January 2021 and between January and the end of March 2021—to be used to help cover wages of workers and reduce the risk that businesses would close, plunging even more people into unemployment.

For many looking on, the government's willingness to provide significant fiscal stimulus was seen as a definite, although short-term, deviation from its previous focus on fiscal austerity wrapped up as responsible economic management. The Prime Minister, when announcing the economic support measures in April 2020, told parliament 'today is not about ideologies. We checked those at the door'.

But it was clear from the outset that the government would eventually pull in the fiscal reins and reduce or remove the support packages that had been put in place. Although they had checked their ideologies at the door, members of the government were quick to point out that the measures

are all temporary, targeted and proportionate to the challenge we face. Our actions will ensure we respond to the immediate challenges we face and help Australia bounce back stronger on the other side, without undermining the structural integrity of the Budget (emphasis added) (Morrison, 2020).

While there were various announcements made during 2020 about a pending end date, It was announced late in 2020 that March 31st 2021 would be the end date of the payment of the COVID-19 supplement in the case of people receiving Jobseeker and an end to the payment of Jobkeeper to eligible businesses.

The announcement of the stimulus end date was by many commentators considered to be premature. On a variety of measures the economy was, despite improvement, still in a fragile state and the general consensus was that by ending the package too soon, the government would

be many of the gains they had made during the bulk of 2020. There is no shortage of evidence illustrating the negative impacts of ending stimulus measures too soon. In Australia, following the global financial crisis, once stimulus was stopped the economy began deteriorating to a point where even prior to the COVID-19 slowdown it was in a weakened position. While, unemployment had not risen to the same extent as other large economies during the GFC, subsequent rises in joblessness saw the unemployment rate rise in the later part of the last decade (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Unemployment rate, 2007 to 2017, Australia, United States of America and United Kingdom

Moreover, given the highly spatially uneven nature of the COVID economic impact, it was very likely that by ending the stimulus too soon, the government would be putting into play a series of events with uneven spatial, regional or community level impacts. It was likely that while some places and the people that live in them would be impacted to a small extent and may even continue on the same economic trajectory they were following prior to the pandemic, others would be more exposed to the wind back and face increasing levels of labour force disadvantage as individuals see their job circumstances change which in turn would have negative economic and social multiplier effects across the broader local community or region.

The ramifications of these uneven spatial outcomes will be felt well beyond the communities in which they first impact. Very likely the broader economy will be impacted through slower growth and less resilience. Politically, members of the Parliament will potentially feel the heat, especially in areas that wear the brunt of the changes. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that political fortunes can be won or lost due to the power of an increasingly disenfranchised electorate. For example, the rise of the One Nation party in the Queensland state election in 1998 was said to be in part a result of a significant number of disgruntled voters wanting to send the traditional parties a message (Davis & Stimson, 1998). In a similar, many believe that the 2016 election win by Donald Trump in the US was partly a result of his ability to reach out

to voters disenchanted with the establishment and similarly, the support that the vote to leave the EU (BREXIT) received in the UK signalled a similar discontent. As an editorial in the LA Times proclaimed: *'Brexit's lesson: Do not underestimate angry voters'*. Picking up on this theme, the current analysis identifies the impact of the wind back of COVID-19 support at the level of Commonwealth Electoral Divisions. In particular, it develops an index accounting for three factors: the impacts of removing the COVID-19 income supplement for Jobseeker recipients; the removal of the Jobkeeper package and; the general strength of the local economy.

2. Methods

The index developed in this analysis identifies those Federal House of Representatives' seats that have higher exposure to the wind back of the government's COVID-19 economic support. To develop the index number used, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA), was applied to a set of three key indicators. The PCA provides a set of factor loadings for these indicators and these are consequently used to develop a simple weighted index.

The three key indicators are and their weightings are:

- The number of Jobseeker claimants as a percentage of the labour force in a seat (0.925).
- The number of Jobkeeper claims as a percentage of total employment in a seat (0.554).
- The percentage change in the number of businesses in the seat 2019 to 2020 (0.135)

The first two indicators provide a measure of the potential impact of the withdrawal of support on individuals in any given seat. We would expect that the measure accounting for the reduction in the level of jobseeker would have a definite impact on the individuals involved as well as the local community and economy. We would expect that the potential impact of the removal of job keeper will be dependent on the ability of local businesses to remaining trading after the payment has been withdrawn. The third indicator provides a measure of the general economic/ business environment in any given seat.

To develop the simple weighted index, each of the individual variables for each of the 151 seats was weighted by the absolute value of corresponding factor loading obtained via the Principal Components Analysis. The three new weighted variables were then summed and divided by three to produce a single index number.

This was then rescaled so that the index ranged between 0 and 100, with higher scores indicating higher relative exposure to the withdrawal of economic stimulus. For further analysis, the 151 seats were divided into 5 groups representing based on the mean score for the index and its standard deviation:

- Seats classed as having Extreme exposure (more and 1 standard deviation above the mean);

- Seats classed as having high exposure (between 1 and 0.5 standard deviations above the mean);
- Mid-range seats (plus and minus 0.5 standard deviations above the mean);
- Seats having relatively low exposure (between 1 and 0.5 standard deviations below the mean); and
- Seats having relatively minimal exposure (more and 1 standard deviation below the mean).

It should be noted that the underlying modelling used to compute the index takes into account individual characteristics at an aggregate level. As a result, any one person living in an extreme exposure seat may have little risk in terms of negative economic impact, while any one person in a relatively minimal exposure seat might, in fact, be very exposed. But in aggregate, we expect that the impacts of the withdrawal of government stimulus will fall predominately in the extreme exposure seats.

3. Exposure to the withdrawal of government economic support

Exposure categories by state

Table 1 presents the 151 Federal House of Representative seats divided by exposure category and state. Clearly, the distribution of seats across exposure types across states reflect the initial economic base of particular seats, the overall impact of the economic slowdown on these seats and the uneven state level impacts imposed by state level responses to COVID outbreaks (i.e. Victoria versus others).

Of the total seats included, 14.9 per cent were classified as having extreme exposure (more than 1 standard deviation from the mean). Apart from Northern Territory which has 1 of its 2 seats in the extreme exposure category (the seat of Lingiari), it is the state of South Australia which has the next largest share of extreme exposure with 2 (Spence (ALP) and Grey (Lib)) out of 10 (20%). Queensland had 16.7 percent of its seats included in this category, including the regional seats of Leichhardt (LNP), Wide Bay (LNP), and Hinkler (LNP) many of which have been impacted by the down turn in international and domestic tourism, and the urban seats of Rankin held by Labor's Jim Chalmers and Longman (LNP). The state of Victoria recorded 13.2 per cent of its seats in the extreme exposure category including the outer metropolitan seats of Calwell (ALP), Fraser (ALP), and Bruce (ALP) in the and the rural seat of Gippsland (NATs). New South Wales recorded just 10.6 percent of its seats as extremely exposed including the metropolitan seats of Blaxland (ALP), Fowler (ALP) and McMahon (ALP) and rural seats such as Lyne and Page both held by the National party. Neither Tasmania, Western Australia, nor the Australian Capital Territory have any seats in the extreme exposure category.

Apart from seats that are categorised as extreme exposure, a second group of vulnerable places are categorised as high exposure seats. We can expect that in relative terms, while these places

won't face the same potential as those in the previous category, they may still be likely to witness negative impacts of the withdrawal of the COVID economic support. In terms of shares, the state of Tasmania has the most seats in this category (60%) with the provincial seat of Bass (LIB) in northern Tasmania, and the rural seats of Lyons (ALP) and Braddon (LIB) included. Six of Queensland's 30 (20%) seats are included in the high exposure category. They include metropolitan seats such as Moncrieff (LNPQ) and Forde (LNPQ) and the rural/provincial seats of Blair (ALP), Kennedy (Katter's) and Herbert (LNPQ). The next highest share of high exposure seats was found in New South Wales where 14.9 per cent of the seats were in this category. These included the metropolitan seats of Werriwa (ALP) and Watson (ALP) and the rural/ provincial seats of New England held by the National's Barnaby Joyce and Gilmore (ALP). Victoria and Western Australia recorded below average shares of high exposure seats. 10.5 percent of Victorian seats were in this category including Lalor (ALP) and Mallee (NATs), while Western Australia had just one of its seats (Durack-LIB) in this category.

All of the states/ territories except the Australian Capital Territory had seats classified as mid-range. Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Northern Territory all had shares in excess of the average, with New South Wales recording the smallest share of mid-range seats (25.5%).

Of the 151 seats included in the analysis, 14.6 percent were classified as having relatively low exposure. Across all states Queensland (23.3 %), South Australia (20%) and New South Wales (14.9%) had shares of relatively low exposure seats above the average. For Queensland the metropolitan seats of Dickson held by the Liberal National Party of Queensland's Peter Dutton, Bonner (LNPQ) and Griffith (ALP) are included, as is the rural seat of Capricornia (LNPQ). South Australia, with 2 seats has the next highest share (20%). The South Australian seats are Boothby (LIB) and Sturt (LIB) in Metropolitan Adelaide. New South Wales has 14.9 per cent of all its seats in the relatively low exposure category. Seats include the metropolitan localities of Sydney held by Labor's Tanya Plibersek, Barton (ALP) and Greenway (ALP) and the rural/provincial seats of Eden-Monaro (ALP) and Macquarie (ALP). Both Victoria and Western Australia have below average shares of seats in this category. The seats included in Victoria are all located in the Melbourne metropolitan region and include McNamara (ALP), Menzies held by the Liberal Party's Kevin Andrews and Goldstein (LIB). Western Australia has one seat categorised as relatively low exposure, the metropolitan seat of Pearce held by the Liberal Party's Christian Porter.

The final category of exposure is labelled relatively minimal exposure, as is represented by seats with an index more than one standard deviation below the mean. The Australian Capital Territory has all of its 3 seats in this category, with only two states, New South Wales and Western Australia, having above average shares. New South Wales has 29.8 per cent of its 47 seats classified as having relatively minimal exposure. The seats are largely metropolitan and include Cook (held by Prime Minister Scott Morrison) and Grayndler (held by opposition leader Anthony Albanese) as well as Mackellar (LIB), North Sydney (LIB) and Hughes held by former liberal member, now independent Craig Kelly. The rural seat of Hume, held by Liberal's Angus Taylor is also included. Western Australia has 18.8 per cent of its 16 seats in

this category including the metropolitan seats of Tangney (LIB), Moore (LIB) and Curtin (LIB). Only two other states have seats classified as relatively minimum exposure. Victoria has 5.3 percent of its seats in this group including Josh Frydenberg’s seat of Kooyong and the Liberal seat of Higgins. In Queensland only the metropolitan seat of Ryan, held by the Liberal National Party is included.

Table 1: Distribution of Federal House of Representative Seats by State and Exposure.

	Relatively minimal exposure	Relatively low exposure	Mid-range	High exposure	Extreme exposure	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	N
NSW	29.8	14.9	25.5	14.9	10.6	47
Vic	5.3	13.2	55.3	10.5	13.2	38
Qld	3.3	23.3	36.7	20.0	16.7	30
SA	0	20.0	60.0	0	20.0	10
WA	18.8	6.3	68.8	6.3	0	16
Tas	0	0	40.0	60.0	0	5
NT	0	0	50.0	0	50.0	2
ACT	100	0	0	0	0	3
Australia	15.2	14.6	41.4	13.9	14.9	151

Exposure by party

The divisions by state provide a broad-brush view of the distribution of seats by exposure type across the country. Drilling down further to consider the distribution according to party provides a different view. It is clear that the Liberal National Party collation holds a large share of seats considered to have relatively minimal or low exposure to the withdrawal of COVID-19 economic support. Of the total seats held by the coalition, 21.1 per cent were classified as relatively minimal exposure while a further 17.1 per cent were classified as having relatively low exposure. This compares to the Australian Labor Party with just 7.4 per cent of its seats classified as having relatively minimal exposure and 13.2 percent having relatively low exposure. Two of the seats held by independent candidates were classified as having relatively minimal exposure.

At the other end of the exposure continuum, Labor party seats are over represented in the extreme exposure category with 16.2 percent of all seats, compared to the average of 14.9 per cent. Conversely, the Liberal / National coalition are underrepresented in this category, with only 11.8 percent of their seats.

Table 2: Distribution of Commonwealth Electoral Divisions by Party.

	Relatively minimal exposure	Relatively low exposure	Mid-range	High exposure	Extreme exposure	
	%	%	%	%	%	N
Liberal / National Coalition	21.1	17.1	35.5	14.5	11.8	76
Australian Labor Party	7.4	13.2	50.5	13.2	16.2	68
Independents / other	28.6	0	57.1	14.3	0	7
Total	15.2	14.6	41.4	13.9	14.9	151

Exposure by prosperity

Another way of thinking about the withdrawal of the COVID economic support is to place it in the context of the level of relative prosperity that existed in the seat prior to the pandemic. The Centre of Full Employment and Equity and Griffith University Index of Prosperity and Distress in Australian Localities rates areas across Australia in terms of their relative economic prosperity and distress based on a range of economic performance factors (Baum, Mitchell, & Flanagan, 2019). The index is divided into five groups:

- Prosperous;
- Comfortable;
- Mid-range;
- At risk
- Distressed.

Taken at face value, there appears to be a clear link between seats classified as having extreme exposure to the wind back of the COVID-19 economic support measures and their initial level of prosperity. Of all the seats considered in the extreme exposure category, 45 percent were classified as being distressed in the Prosperity and Distress index, with a further 20 per cent being classified as being ‘at risk’. The remaining seats were either classified as mid-range in terms of prosperity (25%), with 10 per cent actually being classified as having been prosperous (Figure 2). At the other end of the continuum, the majority of the seats that were classified as having relatively minimal exposure were found to have been either prosperous (47.8 %) or comfortable (34.8%) with much smaller proportions being classified as being mid-range (8.7%) or at risk (8.7%) (Figure 3).




Figure 2: Distribution of Commonwealth Electoral Divisions, Extreme Exposure by Prosperity and Distress Groups




Figure 3: Distribution of Commonwealth Electoral Divisions, Relatively Minimal Exposure by Prosperity and Distress Groups

Concluding comments

The withdrawal of the federal government's dual COVID-19 economic support measures will have a range of impacts on individuals and the communities they live in. For those receiving jobseeker payments, the withdrawal of the COVID-19 supplement of \$150 per fortnight will push them back to attempting to live on income that is substantially below the poverty line. For businesses relying on the Jobkeeper program to stay afloat, the withdrawal of this scheme has the potential to push these businesses to the brink, resulting in closures and unemployment for workers. The combined impact of these changes on local communities and the economies that revolve around these communities are likely to be significant with increasing disadvantage, less economic activity and flow on effects to a much broader range of individuals than those impacted by the initial cuts.

A scan of the seats likely to be most impacted by the withdrawal of support suggests that the pre-covid level of economic prosperity, the economic/ industrial base existing in the seat and the impact of varying state level COVID responses have all been important. For example, issues such as the cessation of international tourism and the decline in domestic travellers has meant that seats with a strong tourism sector have seen increases in jobseeker recipients and increases of businesses on Jobkeeper resulting in the potential for greater exposure to the wind back in these measures.

Politically, the impacts of these changes should be a bi-partisan issue. The political geography of the impacts cut across all parties, with both government and opposition held seats being amongst those with the most significant exposure to the withdrawal of support. Politicians representing voters in the places facing potential exposure should be concerned for the livelihoods of their constituents, and they should be voicing their concerns to the respective party leadership. The political risk for many of these elected officials is that voters view the withdrawal of support and any subsequent economic impacts as an example of a lack of support and caring from their federal representatives resulting in large groups of disgruntled voters. The power of those who feel that the system isn't supporting them, when concentrated in sufficient numbers has, in the past, led to some unexpected outcomes at the ballot box.

To head off the potential for further economic hardship in those locations already hard hit by the COVID-19 economic slowdown, the government should immediately reverse its decision to end the economic support measures it put in place. Now is not the time for neo-liberal posturing about the need for austerity. The government has the ability to fund whatever it wants within the limits of natural and human resources. There is no limit on finance. Deciding to put the economic lives of thousands of individuals and the communities they live in at peril is a political decision only. And for the sake of our social and economic stability and resilience, it should be a decision that is made with the lives of the entire Australian community in mind.

References

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Appendix: Commonwealth Electoral Divisions, Exposure to the withdrawal

Division name	State	Party	Index	Covid support withdrawal impact group	Prosperity and Distress Index Group
Lingiari	NT	ALP	100	Extreme exposure	mid-range
Calwell	VIC	ALP	90.1365706	Extreme exposure	mid-range
Spence	SA	ALP	87.7086495	Extreme exposure	mid-range
Fowler	NSW	ALP	79.8179059	Extreme exposure	distressed
Hinkler	QLD	LNP	74.9620637	Extreme exposure	at risk
Fraser	VIC	ALP	71.168437	Extreme exposure	prosperous
Wide Bay	QLD	LNP	70.7132018	Extreme exposure	distressed
Cowper	NSW	NP	69.8027314	Extreme exposure	distressed
Blaxland	NSW	ALP	68.892261	Extreme exposure	distressed
Bruce	VIC	ALP	66.9195751	Extreme exposure	prosperous
Page	NSW	NP	66.1608498	Extreme exposure	distressed
Richmond	NSW	ALP	64.1881639	Extreme exposure	at risk
Leichhardt	QLD	LNP	63.5811836	Extreme exposure	at risk
McMahon	NSW	ALP	62.8224583	Extreme exposure	distressed
Grey	SA	LP	61.0015175	Extreme exposure	at risk
Rankin	QLD	ALP	58.7253414	Extreme exposure	distressed
Lyne	NSW	NP	56.1456753	Extreme exposure	distressed
Gippsland	VIC	NP	55.9939302	Extreme exposure	mid-range
Longman	QLD	LNP	55.6904401	Extreme exposure	distressed
Gorton	VIC	ALP	54.4764795	Extreme exposure	mid-range

Division name	State	Party	Index	Covid support withdrawal impact group	Prosperity and Distress Index Group
Parkes	NSW	NP	53.262519	high exposure	distressed
Moncrieff	QLD	LNP	52.9590288	high exposure	comfortable
Lalor	VIC	ALP	52.5037936	high exposure	mid range
Werriwa	NSW	ALP	52.0485584	high exposure	distressed
Watson	NSW	ALP	51.2898331	high exposure	distressed
Bass	TAS	LP	51.2898331	high exposure	mid range
Kennedy	QLD	IND	51.138088	high exposure	mid range
Scullin	VIC	ALP	50.6828528	high exposure	prosperous
Blair	QLD	ALP	50.3793627	high exposure	mid range
Mallee	VIC	NP	50.2276176	high exposure	comfortable
Lyons	TAS	ALP	50.0758725	high exposure	comfortable
Braddon	TAS	LP	49.9241275	high exposure	at risk
Durack	WA	LP	49.4688923	high exposure	distressed
Chifley	NSW	ALP	49.1654021	high exposure	distressed
Forde	QLD	LNP	49.0136571	high exposure	at risk
Monash	VIC	LP	47.7996965	high exposure	comfortable
Gilmore	NSW	ALP	46.8892261	high exposure	distressed
Herbert	QLD	LNP	46.8892261	high exposure	distressed
Dobell	NSW	ALP	44.461305	high exposure	at risk
Fadden	QLD	LNP	44.3095599	high exposure	mid range
New England	NSW	NP	44.0060698	high exposure	distressed

Division name	State	Party	Index	Covid support withdrawal impact group	Prosperity and Distress Index Group
Nicholls	VIC	NP	43.7025797	mid-range	comfortable
Corio	VIC	ALP	43.5508346	mid-range	comfortable
Holt	VIC	ALP	42.9438543	mid-range	prosperous
Oxley	QLD	ALP	42.7921093	mid-range	comfortable
Paterson	NSW	ALP	42.0333839	mid-range	distressed
Kingston	SA	ALP	41.8816388	mid-range	comfortable
Flinders	VIC	LP	41.5781487	mid-range	comfortable
Ballarat	VIC	ALP	41.2746586	mid-range	at risk
Fairfax	QLD	LNP	41.2746586	mid-range	mid range
Burt	WA	ALP	40.9711684	mid-range	distressed
Adelaide	SA	ALP	40.8194234	mid-range	comfortable
Bendigo	VIC	ALP	40.2124431	mid-range	at risk
Fisher	QLD	LNP	40.2124431	mid-range	comfortable
McPherson	QLD	LNP	39.7572079	mid-range	mid range
Petrie	QLD	LNP	39.6054628	mid-range	at risk
Macarthur	NSW	ALP	39.3019727	mid-range	distressed
Dunkley	VIC	ALP	38.8467375	mid-range	comfortable
Clark	TAS	IND	38.8467375	mid-range	at risk
Flynn	QLD	LNP	38.0880121	mid-range	distressed
Hindmarsh	SA	ALP	37.6327769	mid-range	mid-range
Groom	QLD	LNP	37.0257967	mid-range	at risk
Canning	WA	LP	36.8740516	mid-range	at risk
Maranoa	QLD	LNP	36.2670713	mid-range	distressed
Cooper	VIC	ALP	36.1153263	mid-range	comfortable
Wills	VIC	ALP	35.9635812	mid-range	mid-range
Barker	SA	LP	35.9635812	mid-range	mid-range
Brand	WA	ALP	35.9635812	mid-range	at risk
Wright	QLD	LNP	35.0531108	mid-range	at risk
Melbourne	VIC	IND	34.7496206	mid-range	prosperous
Robertson	NSW	LP	34.4461305	mid-range	at risk
Hunter	NSW	ALP	34.2943854	mid-range	distressed
Cowan	WA	ALP	33.8391502	mid-range	at risk
Gellibrand	VIC	ALP	33.5356601	mid-range	prosperous
Makin	SA	ALP	33.5356601	mid-range	mid-range
La Trobe	VIC	LP	33.23217	mid-range	comfortable
O'Connor	WA	LP	33.0804249	mid-range	distressed

Stirling	WA	LP	32.7769347	mid-range	at risk
Franklin	TAS	ALP	32.1699545	mid-range	mid-range
Hasluck	WA	LP	32.0182094	mid-range	distressed
Whitlam	NSW	ALP	31.8664643	mid-range	at risk
Wannon	VIC	LP	31.8664643	mid-range	comfortable
Farrer	NSW	LP	31.4112291	mid-range	distressed
Indi	VIC	IND	31.4112291	mid-range	mid-range
Parramatta	NSW	ALP	30.5007587	mid-range	mid-range
Maribyrnong	VIC	ALP	29.8937785	mid-range	prosperous
Moreton	QLD	ALP	29.5902883	mid-range	comfortable
Lindsay	NSW	LP	29.4385432	mid-range	at risk
Isaacs	VIC	ALP	29.4385432	mid-range	comfortable
Swan	WA	LP	29.1350531	mid-range	at risk
Hotham	VIC	ALP	28.831563	mid-range	comfortable
Newcastle	NSW	ALP	28.6798179	mid-range	at risk
Dawson	QLD	LNP	28.6798179	mid-range	distressed
Casey	VIC	LP	28.5280728	mid-range	comfortable
Forrest	WA	LP	28.5280728	mid-range	at risk
Aston	VIC	LP	28.2245827	mid-range	mid-range
Shortland	NSW	ALP	28.0728376	mid-range	distressed
Cunningham	NSW	ALP	27.7693475	mid-range	at risk
Deakin	VIC	LP	27.7693475	mid-range	prosperous
Riverina	NSW	NP	27.6176024	mid-range	distressed
Corangamite	VIC	ALP	27.1623672	mid-range	prosperous
Fremantle	WA	ALP	26.4036419	mid-range	mid-range
Perth	WA	ALP	26.4036419	mid-range	mid-range
McEwen	VIC	ALP	25.6449165	mid-range	prosperous
Mayo	SA	IND	25.6449165	mid-range	prosperous
Solomon	NT	ALP	25.1896813	mid-range	mid-range

Division name	State	Party	Index	Covid support withdrawal impact group	Prosperity and Distress Index Group
Capricornia	QLD	LNP	24.1274659	relatively low exposure	mid-range
Pearce	WA	LP	23.8239757	relatively low exposure	mid-range
Chisholm	VIC	LP	23.5204856	relatively low exposure	prosperous
Boothby	SA	LP	23.5204856	relatively low exposure	prosperous
Bowman	QLD	LNP	23.0652504	relatively low exposure	at risk
Sydney	NSW	ALP	22.9135053	relatively low exposure	prosperous
McNamara	VIC	ALP	22.6100152	relatively low exposure	prosperous
Menzies	VIC	LP	22.4582701	relatively low exposure	comfortable
Lilley	QLD	ALP	22.4582701	relatively low exposure	mid-range
Barton	NSW	ALP	22.15478	relatively low exposure	at risk
Calare	NSW	NP	21.8512898	relatively low exposure	distressed
Banks	NSW	LP	21.6995448	relatively low exposure	at risk
Jagajaga	VIC	ALP	20.7890744	relatively low exposure	comfortable
Brisbane	QLD	LNP	20.1820941	relatively low exposure	prosperous
Sturt	SA	LP	19.7268589	relatively low exposure	comfortable
Greenway	NSW	ALP	18.9681335	relatively low exposure	mid-range
Eden-Monaro	NSW	ALP	17.6024279	relatively low exposure	at risk
Griffith	QLD	ALP	17.6024279	relatively low exposure	prosperous
Macquarie	NSW	ALP	16.8437026	relatively low exposure	mid-range
Dickson	QLD	LNP	16.6919575	relatively low exposure	prosperous
Goldstein	VIC	LP	16.3884674	relatively low exposure	prosperous
Bonner	QLD	LNP	16.0849772	relatively low exposure	mid-range

Division name	State	Party	Index	Covid support withdrawal impact group	Prosperity and Distress Index Group
Grayndler	NSW	ALP	12.8983308	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Hume	NSW	LP	12.7465857	relatively minimal exposure	mid-range
Reid	NSW	LP	12.5948407	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable
Higgins	VIC	LP	12.4430956	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Cook	NSW	LP	11.2291351	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable
Kingsford Smith	NSW	ALP	10.9256449	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable
Kooyong	VIC	LP	10.9256449	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Bennelong	NSW	LP	10.4704097	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable
Tangney	WA	LP	8.95295903	relatively minimal exposure	at risk
Ryan	QLD	LNP	8.04248862	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Mackellar	NSW	LP	7.43550835	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Mitchell	NSW	LP	6.676783	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Wentworth	NSW	LP	5.76631259	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Curtin	WA	LP	5.31107739	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable
Fenner	ACT	ALP	5.31107739	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable
Moore	WA	LP	5.00758725	relatively minimal exposure	at risk
North Sydney	NSW	LP	3.03490137	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Bean	ACT	ALP	2.42792109	relatively minimal exposure	mid-range
Canberra	ACT	ALP	1.97268589	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Berowra	NSW	LP	1.82094082	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable
Bradfield	NSW	LP	1.66919575	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Warringah	NSW	IND	1.36570561	relatively minimal exposure	prosperous
Hughes	NSW	IND	0	relatively minimal exposure	comfortable